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The relation between democracy and capital has always been a tense one, of even total contradiction. Capitalism only feels safe it is ruled by. Start studying Gov test #1 - Capitalism and democracy. the proper role of government and the relationship between the ruling authorities and the population. "Capitalism defends the logic of private property as a fundamental principle. As a corollary, defends the logic of consumption, such as usufruct individually.
Other theories of international relations refute the assumptions of democratic peace theory in this manner. Realism, for example, proposes that regime type has no effect on peace or war, because the brutally competitive nature of the international system forces all states, democratic and non-democratic, to behave similarly see below for further discussion. The policy stakes are also high. The policy implications of the democratic peace are that because democracy causes peace, actors interested in peace should take actions to spread democracy.
Many important foreign policy decisions over the last century have been informed by the belief that democracy causes peace. Its peace must be planted upon the tested foundations of political liberty. President Clinton openly stated his belief in the democratic peace, and this belief in turn informed a number of his policies, including the intervention in Haiti and the expansion of NATO to Eastern Europe Reiter, Especially afterPresident George W.
Bush justified the Iraq War with the democratic peace proposition, arguing that democratizing Iraq would in turn help stabilize the Middle East. The policy implications of whether democracy causes peace persist.
Policy-makers would like to know whether the s deterioration in U. Pakistan is enjoying an encouraging spell of democracy, and this might create an opening for the alleviation of the India-Pakistan rivalry. Though most scholars concede that a pair of democracies is less likely to experience violent conflict than other pairs of states, some critique the inference that this observed pattern implies a causal relationship.
These critics have made two major sets of causal critiques of the inference that the observed correlation of democracy and peace provides support for the hypothesis that democracy causes peace. Is the Democratic Peace Correlation Spurious?
The Spuriousness Critiques The first set of critiques is that the observed correlation between dyadic democracy and peace is spurious. More informally, the critique is that the observed peace between democracies is caused by factors other than democracy, and not by democracy itself. More rigorously, consonant with the definition of a law provided above, the observed peace between democracies would not support the counterfactual that taking a pair of democracies and rendering one of them non-democratic would make their relationship less peaceful.
Whether the democratic peace is spurious or causal is not merely a semantic quibble. Scientists across the social and natural sciences maintain a deep interest in determining whether an observed correlation is causal or merely spurious. Identifying causation is critically important in translating scientific findings into policy recommendations, in areas such as dietary guidelines, poverty reduction, education, fighting disease, and others.
Scholarship making the claim that the democratic peace is spurious frequently takes the following form. On the theoretical side, an alternative explanation for the causes of peace is provided. On the empirical side, a critique will present a previously published multivariate regression analysis showing support for the dyadic democratic peace, and then show that adding to this regression analysis an additional independent variable that measures the new, alternative explanation will cause the dyadic democratic peace variable to become statistically insignificant.
In turn, the inference is that the initial observed correlation between democracy and peace is spurious rather than causal, and that as a causal hypothesis the democratic peace proposition is not supported. A further implication is that because the democracy-peace relationship is spurious rather than causal, policy-makers should avoid concluding that spreading democracy will in turn cause the world to be more peaceful.
The oldest and perhaps most central proposition of this type is the realist argument that common national interests rather than joint democracy explain peace. As indicated above, realism proposes that international relations are fundamentally driven by national interests, and not by domestic politics or institutions. Further, realism places no faith in the ability of public opinion coupled with democratic institutions to be a force for peace, because public opinion is not necessarily rational or peaceful; and because elected and other leaders can circumvent the constraints of public opinion through secrecy and other forms of manipulation e.
Historically, the collapse of the international order in the interwar period made realist critics such as E.
Is Democracy a Cause of Peace?
Waltz ;p. Several quantitative studies have endeavored to demonstrate that decisions for war and peace are caused by realist factors such as national interests and the balance of power, and not by regime type.
In the s, realist critics took note that the first wave of rigorous quantitative democratic peace studies focused on the — time period, suggesting that especially during this Cold War period democracies were unwilling to fight each other not because of institutions or norms, but because North American, East Asian, West European, and South Pacific democracies needed to balance together against a common Communist threat.
A variant of this argument is that peace among democracies during the Cold War was maintained by American hegemony, that a democratic America managed conflict among states within the democratic, anti-Communist bloc to solidify its global power position. These studies took different approaches to demonstrating this point.
Gowa argued that the democratic peace was a temporal phenomenon; that pairs of democracies were indeed less likely to become involved in militarized interstate disputes or wars after ; were less likely than other pairs of states to become involved in MIDs but not wars from —; and were as likely to become involved in wars and MIDs before World War I. That is, she measured the presence of common interest indirectly by comparing political eras, arguing that democracies shared common interests afterconfronting the Communist threat, and therefore unsurprisingly were less likely to fight each other.
Before World War II, she argued, when there were fewer common interests among democracies, the observed correlation between democracy and peace disappears.
Gartzke took a more direct approach toward testing the same theoretical supposition. He also proposed that common interest rather than joint democracy was the true cause of the observed peace between democracies, especially in the post period. Rather than comparing eras as Gowa did, he analyzed the post period, but included in his regression analysis a variable of common interest, measuring how similar were the United Nations General Assembly voting patterns of two states.
He found that this variable was statistically significantly related to dyadic peace, and that inclusion of this variable rendered the joint democracy variable statistically insignificant as an explanation of dyadic peace. Some observers have also suggested that the observed peace between democracies is caused by geographic factors rather than regime type Worley, An additional cut on the national interests argument is that conflicts are caused by interstate disputes over contested issues, like territory, and not by regime type.
Gibler focused on territorial disagreements between states. He proposed that territorial disagreements are the fundamental cause of conflict between states, and that inclusion of variables that measure the stability of borders, and therefore the absence of territorial disagreement, rendered the joint democracy independent variable to be statistically insignificant as a cause of peace.
A second cluster of spuriousness critiques focuses on economic rather than political factors. A perhaps more limited version of this critique is that there is a peace among democracies, but only in the developed world and not in developing areas such as sub-Saharan Africa Henderson, A more ambitious form of this critique is that development and markets are the true causes of peace, and that democracy is uncorrelated with peace when these factors are accounted for.
There are some variants of this observation. Gartzke focused on higher levels of economic development, proposing that more developed states enjoy lower marginal gain from winning a war over economic assets, and in turn are less likely to become embroiled in war.
Mousseau forthcoming ; made a different argument, proposing that only some forms of economic development nurture peace. He proposed that market-based societies place a cultural emphasis on contracts and the law. In turn, this cultural emphasis on law percolates into foreign policy preferences, pushing such states to prefer nonviolent means of conflict resolution.
A third critique focuses on gender. Further, some scholars have used gendered perspectives to critique the proposition that democracy causes peace. Wisotzki suggested that gender equality encourages both democracy and peace, though she stopped short of proposing that there was no causal relationship between democracy and peace.
Hudson and colleagues used new data on the physical security of women and political violence, finding that lower physical security of women makes political violence more likely, and that the inclusion of gender equality in the analysis renders democracy an insignificant determinant of peace. Another possible critique, not quite leveled explicitly by any critics, is that common culture and common identity, rather than democracy, cause peace. Discussion To the great benefit of the broader field, these democratic peace critiques have enjoyed intensive scholarly debate, with both supporters and critics of the democratic peace successfully pushing each other to refine and improve their theoretical arguments and research designs.
Regarding the critique that the democratic peace was purely a Cold War phenomenon, Russett and OnealMaozand Thompson and Tucker demonstrated that democracies were less likely to fight each other in the interwar and pre-World War I periods as well as in the post period.
Russett also presented evidence of a democratic peace in ancient Greece and in pre-modern societies, and Park demonstrated that the democratic peace existed in the post-Cold War period, as well. Cederman took a different angle in addressing this question of the democratic peace being confined to the post time period.
He agreed that the peaceful tendencies of democracies had strengthened over time, but he proposed that such a dynamic reflects the kinds of macrohistorical learning process that Kant himself predicted would happen.
The proposal that capitalism rather than democracy causes peace has also attracted critiques, mostly focusing on issues of research design to show that inclusion of capitalism variables does not render democracy variables insignificant Choi, ; Dafoe, The observation that contractualism and not democracy causes peace has been critiqued Dafoe et al.
The proposal that at least during the Cold War American hegemony rather than democracy itself fostered peace between democracies has also attracted scholarly debate. A broader question is whether or not the United States at least during the Cold War used its power to maintain both democracy and peace within its sphere of influence.
In general, the United States supported a variety of anti-Communist states, including democracies like Japan and France and non-democracies like South Vietnam and South Korea Reiter, The critique that conflict is caused by territorial dispute rather than regime type has also experienced rigorous debate e.
Huth and Allee found that democracy played an important role in affecting whether or not territorial rivalries escalated to violence. Other studies looked at the related issue of rivalry between states, territorial dispute being one type of rivalry.
The gender critique has also enjoyed some scholarly exchange. The most aggressive gender-based critique of the democratic peace Hudson et al. As noted, some other work that focuses on interstate conflict has included gender as an independent variable, and still shown that democracy has a pacifying effect. Using a dyadic research design, Regan and Paskeviciuti found that both gender and joint democracy affect the likelihood of interstate violence.
In short, the variety of critiques arguing that inclusion of additional variables in multivariate regressions of observational data renders democracy variables to be insignificant have each enjoyed rigorous debate.
A larger question to consider is whether there are other ways of testing causation beyond this approach of testing the possibility of spuriousness by adding variables to a regression.
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There is a broader debate as to the general utility of multivariate regression of observational data as a means of assessing causation, given that this approach, sometimes called a quasi-experiment, requires the nonrandom assignment of the treatment condition the independent variable. This is not to take a maximalist position that quasi-experiments add nothing, or that adding variables is never advised. It does suggest, however, considering other means of assessing causation, in addition to the conventional approach of seeing if adding plausible exogenous variables renders the democracy-peace correlation to be statistically insignificant.
Scholars have explored other means of assessing causation in the democratic peace, and have amassed three other types of evidence that support the conclusion that democracy causes peace: The first type of evidence explores for the existence of other empirical patterns predicted by democratic peace theory.
Democracy or Capitalism?
If a theory predicts the existence of a variety of empirical patterns and these patterns are demonstrated through tests, we can be more confident in the validity of the theory, and in turn that observed correlations are causal and not just spurious. And, indeed, there is a wide array of quantitative empirical studies that provide support for various assumptions or implications of democratic peace theory, especially for institutionalist accounts of the democratic peace.
Perhaps the central institutionalist explanation of the democratic peace proposes that elected leaders are motivated to avoid fighting wars, because the costs of wars will incite popular discontent in turn threatening their hold on power. Studies have demonstrated a number of empirical patterns consistent with this view. Democracies suffer fewer casualties when they fight wars Valentino et al. During war, public support erodes as the perceived likelihood of victory declines Gelpi et al.
Consistent with the audience costs explanation, democracies can more effectively signal their resolve than at least some kinds of autocratic states Schultz, ; Weeks, There are also some studies supporting elements of the normative explanation. In the immediate post-war period, very few countries had democracy. Vast regions of the world were subject to European colonialism, which served to consolidate European-North American capitalism. Europe was devastated by a war provoked by German supremacy and in the East there was a consolidation of the communist regime, which was seen as an alternative to liberal democracy.
It was in this context that so-called democratic capitalism emerged, a system that consisted of the idea that, in order to be compatible with democracy, capitalism ought to be strongly regulated.
This entailed the nationalisation of key sectors of the economy, progressive taxation, the imposition of collective bargaining and even — as happened in the West Germany of that era — the participation of workers in the management of firms.
Is Democracy a Cause of Peace? - Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics
On the scientific plane, Keynes represented economic orthodoxy and Hayek dissidence. This change altered the terms of the distributive conflict, but it did not eliminate it. On the contrary, it kept all the conditions for inflaming it for the three following decades, when economic growth became paralysed.
And this is what happened. Sincecentral States have managed the conflict between the demands of citizens and the demands of capital by recourse to a range of solutions that have gradually conferred more power to capital.