All presume that the causal effects of democracy on development are, on balance . As a result, the causal story we have to tell is necessarily quite complex. . For example, citizens may learn that a party or politician is corrupt, or that a party's. For the Commonwealth Secretariat, democracy and development constitute the two main pillars of the most important dimensions of the complex relationship definition is still on contestation, or the electoral process. itself. Democracy, Governance and Development: A Conceptual Framework For example, tourists tend to come from high-income countries; .. Governance is a neutral concept comprising the complex mechanisms, processes, relationships.
Modernization theory was the dominant view in comparative political science for most of the last century. Although it has since been dethroned, it is still incredibly common in research. The basic notion is that economic development causes democratization although at some point the claim was softened to just that they are strongly correlated. A Note About Generalization What we are talking about here is a generalization of how the world works. Like commenters and other answers have pointed out - you can always find examples where it doesn't seem to apply perfectly.
This is entirely normal. It just means there are things yet to be explained in the world. The Theory Basically, the theory is just that as an economy develops it also tends to become more democratic. He uses some indicators of economic development and shows that the countries with high levels of economic development are also the ones that are democracies.
Cutright goes a lot further as did a lot of other modernization theorists: Similarly, if a democratic country's economy slipped it would eventually become less democratic. What does a developed economy look like? Of course, this research will very highly depend on how you measure the state of an economy. A developed economy should be higher in urbanization. This does tend to happen as an economy develops agricultural workers move to urban areas to take jobs in manufacturing, and eventually the manufacturing jobs are lost to service jobs.
Back in the hey-day of modernization theory, this was measured as the number of telephones per 1, people.Democracy and Development (Ethical Dilemmas in International Development)
Not only can a developed nation afford telephones, communication lines are valuable for economic growth. A developed nation has a well-educated work force. The reasoning is again two-fold: More income per person should generally indicate a more developed economy.
The modernization "story" The common story of modernization theory begins with an undeveloped, authoritarian government. With time the economy grows, resulting in higher wages and standards of living. Once they have leisure time, people will want education, better quality of goods, and entertainment.
The causal relationship between economic development and democracy - Politics Stack Exchange
These people will increasingly demand better education for their kids so they can also find good jobsbasic freedoms to express their views, and government support for programs that will improve their lives such as social welfare programs or education funding.
At this point the government will either cave to that pressure and democratize, or it will crush democracy movements in turn destroying the kinds of citizens it needs to maintain its economy. In fact there is evidence now that with the recent advent of democracy in these countries, some of the earlier commitments of their governments have become weaker as, for example, in the case of the promised withdrawal of protection of small manufacturing enterprises against competition from the chaebols in South Korea.
If market competition in general, and international competition in particular, is important in the development process, as a disciplining factor on productive efficiency and as an inducement to cost and quality consciousness, it is necessary to examine the role democratic institutions play in the management of conflicts that inevitably arise from the disruptions and dislocations in social and economic life that market competion brings in its wake.
Such corporatist regimes usually tend toward authoritarian practices, but the latter are not strictly necessary as the history until recently of centralized wage bargaining in the open economies of democratic Scandinavia, or of industrial policy in the small European states Katzenstein has written about, amply demonstrates.
But the initial conditions in the latter countries were arguably rather special, and quite different particularly from more heterogeneous and unequal societies.
To the extent an authoritarian regime provides a more unified line of command, the common agency problem may be somewhat less severe. Rasmusen and Ramseyer have modelled a coordination problem8 in bribe collection in democratic polities: In some actual democratic polities such coordination problems are reduced by committee systems, disciplined factions and party political machines.
It is reported that in postwar potentially imposes on every other legislator, when they cannot coordinate their votes to demand a bribe which compensates them for that externality. Japan the Liberal Democratic Party particularly its so-called Policy Affairs Research Council, where important policies were made and pay-offs were coordinated behind closed doors has been quite successful in centralizing bribery. Coordinated corruption may, of course, have less adverse consequences for resource allocation efficiency than uncoordinated corruption, as Shleifer and Vishny have suggested comparing corruption in Communist Russia with that in the post-Communist yearssince in the former case the bribee will internalize some of the distortionary effects of corruption.
The important question here, however, is how the ruler can credibly promise to keep the contributions lump-sum, and not come back again for quid pro quo deals at the margin.
The autonomy of the state has other costs in terms of economic efficiency. Bureaucratic insulation makes it difficult to attain flexibility in dealing with changes in technical and market conditions and may thus discourage risk-taking and also in correcting wrong decisions.
This flexibility has been maintained in East Asia by fostering a dense network of ties between public officials and private entrepreneurs through deliberative councils as in Japan or South Korea or through the tightly-knit party organization as in Taiwanallowing operational space for negotiating and renegotiating goals and policies, sharing information and risks, and for coordinating decisions and mutual expectations with remarkable speed.
Such cozy governmentbusiness relations9 are more difficult to achieve or politically more suspect in societies like in South Asia that are more heterogeneous and unequal. In many situations the state is neither a Stackelberg leader nor a Stackelberg follower.
Neither the state actors nor the private interest groups usually have the power to unilaterally define the parameters of their action. Both may be strategic actors with some power to influence the terms, and the outcome of the bargaining game depends on their varying bargaining strengths in different situations.
Set in a bargaining framework, one may begin to resolve a problem of motivation that afflicts much of the discussion on the relationship between authoritarianism and development.
An authoritarian ruler may be better insulated and may have the capacity to resist particularistic pressures, but why would he be interested in playing a positive role in the development process? But in this model the power of the ruler to collect taxes or rents is invariant with respect to the policies to promote productivity.
But what if some of the latter policies increase the disagreement payoffs and hence tilt the bargaining outcome in favor of the ruled?
Democracy and Development A Complex Relationship
As Robinson has emphasized, it may not be rational for an autocrat to carry out institutional changes that safeguard property rights, law enforcement, and other economically beneficial structures, if in the process his rent-extraction machinery has a chance of being damaged or weakened.
He may not risk upsetting the current arrangement for the uncertain prospect of a share in a larger pie. In contrast, in South Korea and Taiwan initial conditions were much more favorable to the ruled with land reforms and expansion of mass educationand one of the few ways open to the dictators to secure their position was to derive their legitimacy from ambitious programs of shared economic growth thus shifting the whole bargaining frontier outwardthat would also serve nationalistic goals like catching up with Japan and warding off the Communist threat.
I Democracy helps development through the accountability mechanisms it installs for limiting the abuse of executive power, and provides a system of periodic punishments for undesirable government interventions in the economy and rewards for desirable interventions.
Accountability mechanisms are particularly important in averting disasters; in their absence major ecological damages in the ex-Soviet Union and Eastern Europe went on unchecked for too long. Sen has commented that Indian democracy, with its free press and vigorous opposition parties, has been politically quicker in averting sporadic threats of famines and starvation deaths; but at the same time, the Indian political system, unlike the Chinese, seems to have been unable to deal effectively with endemic hunger and malnutrition.
Sometimes in a democracy it seems easier to focus political attention to dramatic disturbances in a low-level equilibrium, than to the lowness of the level itself. If there is a public complaints mechanism is in place, a democratic regime, other things remaining the same, may generate too many complaints since the penalty for complaints is usually relatively10 lowand thus leading to too much screening and the consequent delay of projects, compared to an authoritarian regime where complaints may be more risky.
Of course, in many democracies public scrutiny particularly of high officials is constrained by laws regarding official secrecy like the Official Secrets Act of that the Indian government inherited from the British and the difficulty auditors always face in disentangling malfeasance from sheer incompetence the rules of punishment are quite different for the two, and in the case of the latter often non-existent in insulated bureaucracies.
Checks and balances in a bureaucracy often involve a multiple veto power system. While this system inevitably involves delay in decision-making, it is supposed to keep corrupt officials in check.
One high official in New Delhi is reported to have told a friend: A multiple veto system also has an inherent bias toward rejecting too many good proposals or what is called Type I error and inhibiting against risk-taking in general. Of course, the type of a decision-making structure in economic administration is not uniquely related to the nature of political regime; a democratic public administration may be organized as a centralized hierarchy, whereas an authoritarian ruler may choose to organize his economic administration up to a certain level as 10 Whistleblowers losing jobs are not infrequent in democratic regimes.
In a situation of highly imperfect information the desirability of even uninformed central control varies, as Bolton and Farrell show, according to the relative importance of private information and the need for coordination, which may vary from case to case. They also point, drawing from the literature on dynamic incentive contracts, to the importance of commitment constraints.
Going back to our earlier discussion, we may note again that authoritarianism is neither necessary nor sufficient for commitment.
In developing countries where much of the economy is in the vast informal sector and dispersed in far-flung villages and small towns, the accountability mechanisms of democracy are particularly important at the local community level.
Large-scale development projects directed from above by an insulated modernizing elite are often inappropriate technologically or environmentally, and far removed from or insensitive to local community needs and concerns. Rather than involving the local people and tapping into the large reservoir of local information, ingenuity, and initiative, these projects often treat them simply as objects of the development process; they end up primarily as conduits of largesse for middlemen and contractors and encourage widespread parasitism on the state.
There is, however, no one-to-one relationship between the strength of democracy at the national political level and that of institutions of accountability at the local level.
In large parts of Northern India, for example, it is common to observe the serious problem of absenteeism of salaried teachers in village public schools and of doctors in rural public health clinics. The villagers are usually quite aware of the problem but do not have the institutional means of correcting it, as the state-funded teachers and doctors are not answerable to the villagers in the insufficiently decentralized system.
Similar accounts are available of more effective public pressure in rural basic education and health services in Cuba compared to some of the more democratic regimes in Latin America. There are, of course, many authoritarian countries where local accountability is completely absent and the situation is much worse than in North India. Even in otherwise centralized bureaucracies the nature of institutional design for the delegation of implementation tasks to local-level agencies is not uniquely related to the nature of the political regime at the national level.
Wade forthcoming points to interesting contrasts between the mode of operation of the Korean irrigation bureaucracy under an authoritarian regime in the recent past and that of the Indian, and the clearly more locally effective performance of the former.
Democracy and Development A Complex Relationship - Relação entre Desenvolvimento e
The Indian canal systems are large, centralized hierarchies in charge of all functions operations and maintenance as well as design and construction. In Korea there are functionally separate organizations in the canal systems. The implementation and routine maintenance tasks are delegated to the Farmland Improvement Associations, one per catchment area, which are staffed by local part-time farmers selected by the village chiefsknowledgeable about changing local conditions, dependent for their salary and operational budget largely on the user fees paid by the farmers, and continually drawing upon local trust relationships.
In general local democracies are supposed to be more vulnerable to corruption than the national government. One of the central results of the literature on collective action is that small group size and proximity help collective action. Collusions are thus easier to organize and enforce in proximate groups, risks of being caught and reported are easier to manage, and the multiplex interlocking social and economic relationships among the local influential people act as formidable barriers to entry into these cozy rental havens.
On the other hand, if institutions of local democracy are firmly in place along with a vigorous opposition party and free press, the political process can be more transparent and the theft of funds and the sale of influence become more visible compared to the system of centralized corruption.
As Crook and Manor point out on the basis of indirect but strong evidence in the case of state of Karnataka in South India, this may reduce the overall amount of money and resources siphoned off through corruption: But, ironically, on account of the increased openness and visibility of the system compared to the earlier centralized system, local people believed, often wrongly, that corruption has increased.
There are many situations in which decentralization may leave the poor grievously exposed to the mercies of the local overlords and their malfeasance. There are certain fixed costs of organizing resistance groups or countervailing lobbies.
As a result the poor may sometimes be more unorganized at the local level than at the national level where they can pool their organizing capacities. In these situations they may even be able occasionally to play pivotal roles in national coalitions and get redistributive transfers in their favor under centralized systems. Under conditions of social and economic inequality expansion of democracy may also have ambiguous effects on collective action in management of the local commons irrigation, forestry, fisheries, grazing land, etc.
While there may have been some bit of a sharing ethic, the predominant social norm was often that of an unequal patron-client system, in which the powerful who might enjoy disproportionate benefits from the institutions of cooperation enforced the rules of the game and gave leadership to solidaristic efforts.
As the advent of 1 For a formal treatment of the problem of asymmetric enforcement and exit options in the context of conservation of local common-pool resources in terms of a non-coperative game, see Dayton-Johnson and Bardhan There follows increased dependence on the state bureaucracy to carry out functions like local resource management and maintenance of local public goods which earlier used to be in the domain of locally autonomous, though hierarchical and lop-sided, organizations.
Many rural communities in poor countries are now in this difficult transition period, with traditional cooperative institutions on the decline, while the new self-governing associations, based on defined rights and legal-rationalistic norms like regular auditing of accounts or checks and balances on arbitrary use of power are yet struggling to be born.